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Abstract
This paper explores how transactions between smugglers and migrants come about in the
context of irregular migration. We first offer some theoretical reflections on the chal-
lenges that such a context poses to both parties—smugglers and migrants—and point to
three main conditions under which smuggling transactions take place: illegality, asym-
metrical information and low trust. Next, we explore the strategies that migrants and
smugglers alike may employ to overcome these challenges. We focus on three broad sets
of strategies related to information-gathering, to information-checking (reputation and the
role of physical and virtual communities) and to developing substitutes for trust (guar-
antees, escrow services and hostage-taking strategies à la Thomas Schelling). To illustrate
our reasoning, we draw on examples from published works as well as from a novel set of
43 qualitative interviews with migrants recently smuggled to Europe. Such interviews
were carried out in a destination country (England) and in a transit country (Greece).
Evidence from this work supports previous calls to move away from a simplistic
“predator-victim” discourse.
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Introduction
In the 5-year period 2014–2018, a combined 1.86 m illegal border crossings (IBCs) have been
recorded at the Greek and Italian borders (Frontex 2017, 2019).1 A roughly similar number of
IBCs have been detected by US law enforcement authorities at the Mexico-US border between
European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10610-020-09459-y
1The data from Frontex also include Malta; however, the number of illegal border crossings attributable to Malta
is very limited (see also Campana 2017).
* Paolo Campana
pc524@cam.ac.uk
1 Institute of Criminology, University of Cambridge, Sidgwick Avenue, Cambridge CB3 9DA, UK
Published online: 27 July 2020
2013 and 2017 (1.94 m; DHS 2019: 121). Based on interviews with apprehended migrants, US
Border Patrol have estimated a smuggler “usage rage” of between 80 and 95% in 2015. Data
from the Mexican Migration Project at Princeton University suggest a similar level of
smuggler involvement—close to 90% in 2017 (Sanchez 2018a: 153). Moreover, in 2018,
the EU Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) conducted voluntary interviews with newly
arrived migrants in Italy, Greece and Spain: 84% of the migrants interviewed claimed that they
used a smuggler while only 7% stated that they had not (9% did not reply to the question; alas,
the total number of interviews was undisclosed but the findings are nevertheless interesting:
Frontex 2019: 28). Enlisting the services of a smuggler is not without its challenges: first, one
needs to identify potential smugglers and then one needs to check their credentials, make a
judgement about their trustworthiness and—ultimately—make a decision over whether to
entrust one’s life to a specific smuggler or not. These are not easy decisions. Yet data from
both Europe and the USA show that large volumes of transactions between migrants and
smugglers have indeed taken place. How do people make such decisions in the context of
migration outside state-sanctioned channels?
In this paper, we explore how these transactions have come about in a context characterised
by challenging conditions: severe risks, low trust and asymmetry of the information available.
We consider both smugglers and migrants as rational actors who seek to choose the best option
compared to the alternatives available (Elster 1989). As put it by Elster (1989: 20), when
“faced with several courses of action, people usually do what they believe it is likely to have
the best overall outcome”. Interviews with migrants carried out as part of this study confirmed
that people had a set of alternatives available to them when choosing a smuggler, and they had
to make difficult decisions as to what option to pick, bearing in mind the constraints on
selection by virtue of their migrant status. We follow Elster (1989: 13) in seeing social actions
as the end result of a two-stage process: first, all abstractly possible actions that an individual
might undertake are filtered by physical, economic and sociological constraints; second, an
action is carried out within the resulting opportunity set. In this paper, we focus on the second
stage of this process.
Our approach challenges the “binary predator-victim position that saturates the official
discourse on illegal migration” (Zhang, Sanchez and Achilli 2018: 8) and offers a more
nuanced perspective on human smuggling (in line with Doomernik and Kyle 2004; Zhang
2007; Sanchez 2015; Achilli 2018; Sanchez and Zhang 2018). As Zhang, Sanchez and Achilli
(2018: 8) point out, “the binary predator-victim perspective rarely applies in a context where
both migrants and smugglers actively engage in negotiating, vetting and trading”. Let us
reiterate that this does not imply that migrants face matters without risks, nor that the
relationship between smuggler and migrant is symmetrical—quite the opposite. Yet, strategies
to decrease risk and overcome the challenges posed by the context of irregular migration have
been developed by both smugglers and migrants.
Purpose of the Paper
The aim of this paper is to explore both the challenges related to transactions in the context of
human smuggling and the strategies developed to overcome these challenges. In this paper, we
offer some theoretical reflections on how the choice of a smuggler might come about and
discuss the decision-making process underpinning such difficult and consequential decisions.
This paper proceeds as follows: the next section introduces the methodology underpinning
the work, including a discussion of the research design and the methods of data analysis. The
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following section discusses the problems related to transacting under conditions of illegality,
asymmetrical information and low trust. Next, the paper looks at the strategies that migrants—
and smugglers alike—might employ to address these problems: information-gathering (“Gath-
ering Information”), information-checking (“Judging a Smuggler’s Trustworthiness”) and
substitutes for trust (“Substitutes for Trust: Guarantees, Escrow Services And Hostage-Tak-
ing”). The “Conclusions” section concludes.
Methodology: Research Design, Methods and Ethical Considerations
To illustrate our reasoning, we draw examples from published works as well as from a novel
body of evidence derived from 43 qualitative interviews with migrants recently smuggled to
Europe. Such interviews were collected during a fieldwork that encompassed both a destina-
tion country (England) and a transit country (Greece). We carried out two sets of interviews.
The first set consists of 19 semi-structured in-depth interviews with Arabic-speaking
refugees carried out in various cities in England in July and August 2016. Interviews were
conducted in Arabic by a native speaker and then translated into English by the same person.
These interviews are quoted in the text using an ID from 1 to 19. The second set consists of 24
informal interviews conducted during two field visits to Greece. These interviews are quoted in
the text using an ID from 20 to 43. This set of informal interviews was carried out in four
settings: Athens, Idomeni and two refugee camps in the Thessaloniki area. A translator assisted
during the interviews. The field visits took place in March–April 2016 and August 2016. In
both cases, the interviewees were identified using a snowball sampling technique.
Access to participants was facilitated by contacts with volunteers and non-government
organisations (NGOs) assisting migrants in, respectively, England and Greece. In total, there
were interviews with 43 migrants: 33 males and 10 females. With regard to their declared
nationality, interviewees were predominantly Syrian (34): two were Iranian, two Iraqi, two
Sudanese, one Moroccan, one Kuwaiti and one Turkish (Kurdish).
In order to analyse the data, all the interviews were transcribed and merged into a single text
file. Secondly, we conducted a thematic content analysis of the interviews based on the broad
themes discussed in the paper (e.g. “trust”, “cheating”, “information-gathering”, “information-
checking”). Within each theme, we then coded sub-categories as they emerged from the
content of the interviews. While the first step has been mostly top-down, in the second, we
have let the evidence speak for itself as much as possible (on content analysis, see
Krippendorff 2004).
Consent was given for the interviews, although not all the participants wished to give
indication of their consent in writing (for obvious reasons regarding their status). In these
cases, consent was recorded orally.
Challenges of Transacting in the Context of Irregular Migration
This paper interprets human smuggling as a form of illegal trade in which the commodity
traded is primarily the illegal entry into a country—in line with Bilger et al. (2006), Kleemans
(2011) and Campana and Varese (2016). This sets smuggling apart from human trafficking, as
in the latter case, the commodity traded is primarily control over a person (see Campana and
Varese 2016 for a theoretical discussion, and Hales and Gelsthorpe 2012 for experiences of
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trafficked women). By definition, trade takes place in a market, which in turn is characterised
by supply and demand. In this specific instance, migrants constitute the demand-side of the
market: they are willing to buy a service, i.e. illegal entry into a country, for a variety of
reasons that include leaving war zones, escaping poverty, avoiding persecution or looking for a
better life (see, among others, Robinson and Segrott 2002; Antonopoulos and Winterdyk 2006;
Yildiz 2017, Optimity Advisors and Seefar 2017: 15 for a discussion of the motivations to
migrate). The demand for smuggling services is satisfied by a number of sellers. In this specific
market, they are collectively defined as smugglers. When framed in this way, smuggling is the
outcome of a successful transaction, i.e. an agreement between a smuggler and a migrant. The
context in which these transactions take place is challenging due to a number of conditions. In
this paper, we focus on three such conditions: illegality, asymmetrical information and low
trust.
Decisions Under Condition of Illegality
Following the UN Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants (UN 2000), which has now
been signed by 112 states, the smuggling of migrants is considered a criminal offence “when
committed intentionally and in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other
material benefit” (Article 6). Due to its condition of illegality, the market for smuggling
services is characterised by the absence of formal enforcement mechanisms to solve disputes,
ensure compliance and enforce contracts (Reuter 1983: Ch. 5; Campana and Varese 2013). In
addition, transactions may be hindered by the mobility of illegal actors as well as by the
difficulties in creating a credit market to sustain them (Reuter 1983 and 1985; Campana and
Varese 2013). Furthermore, illegality has a direct impact on the availability and quality of
information available. Sellers may find it very difficult and costly to freely advertise their
products and their reputation (Reuter 1983; Gambetta 2009; Campana and Varese 2013).
Buyers, on the other hand, may find it difficult to collect reliable information about the quality
of goods and services given the absence of reputable independent sources (Campana and
Varese 2013). There is evidence that a higher level of enforcement increases the need to enlist
the service a smuggler (Massey et al. 2016: 1590). At the same time, a higher level of
enforcement exacerbates the challenges faced when enlisting such smugglers.
Decisions Under Condition of Asymmetrical Information
In 1970, economist George Akerlof explored the problem of quality uncertainty in his seminal
paper on the market for lemons (“lemon” is an American slang word to describe a highly-
flawed item, in the case of Akerlof a poor second-hand car). In Akerlof’s model, the second-
hand car market is populated by two types of goods: good quality cars and bad quality cars
(“lemons”). Sellers have more knowledge about the quality of a given car than the buyers, and
it is very difficult for the latter to tell the difference between a good car and a bad car. This puts
the buyer in a difficult position, as she knows that some cars are indeed of low quality, but she
is not able to sort them from the good quality ones. Sellers of good quality cars are also
affected as they suffer from the (unfair) competition from the sellers of bad cars, and, as a
result, they may have to accept a lower price or exit the market altogether. In Akerlof’s
example, the market is characterised by a problem of asymmetrical information between
buyers and sellers, and this problem—if left unaddressed—is predicted to lead to the collapse
of the market itself (Akerlof 1970: 490–492).
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Arguably, the same problem is present in the case of human smuggling: smugglers hold
more information about the quality of their services than their potential clients, and the latter
have to make decisions with imperfect information and under conditions of uncertainty (Bilger
et al. 2006). If the smugglers were all equally callous and sellers of lemons, then information
asymmetries would be irrelevant. However, evidence from different studies shows that there is
variation among smugglers in the “level” of service they provide. Ayalew Mengiste (2018:
70–71) presents testimonies of Eritreans migrants who portrayed their smugglers’ actions in
positive terms. Based on his fieldwork with Syrian migrants, Achilli (2018: 83) similarly
recalls that “accounts about the callousness of smugglers were often dismissed by those very
people who risked their life crossing the Mediterranean. The majority of migrants with whom I
spoke did not perceive their smugglers as exploitative”. Sanchez (2018: 35) presents first-hand
stories of women smuggled on the Mexico-US route and maintains that many of her inter-
viewees shared “stories of supporting male and female smuggling facilitators during their
transit” (see also Sanchez 2015, Chapter 4). Based on her fieldwork on the island of Lesbos,
Siegel (2019) writes that “human smugglers […] were not considered as criminals, at least not
by the migrants who had been smuggled. On the contrary, the smugglers were seen as
important helpers”.
Some of our interviewees equally felt protected by the smuggler while en route: “Yes, there
was [protection]. For example, if someone tried to take something from me, the smuggler
would stop the person” (interview 6; also interviews 15 and 16). Maher (2018) expresses a
similar view about protection in relation to smuggling from West Africa.
Yet cheaters and unscrupulous smugglers do exist. For example, Spener (2009) documents
instances of individuals posing as smugglers in bus terminals and areas around the interna-
tional bridges in Mexican border towns in order to swindle migrants or lead them to isolated
places and then assault and rob them (Spener 2009: 155; also Slack and Martínez 2018: 153).
In a (rare) quantitative survey carried with migrants who had enlisted the services of smugglers
to cross from Mexico into the USA, 75% of the 655 interviewees declared that they were
satisfied with the service provided by their smuggler (Slack and Martínez 2018: 162).
However, only 45% would recommend their smuggler to a family member or a friend (even
among those who were satisfied, only slightly more than half would recommend their
smuggler: 57%; Slack and Martínez 2018: 162). As one of our interviewees put it, “there
are a lot of smugglers... good and bad, those who steal [and those who don’t]” (interview 11).
The evidence from different routes points to the existence of both “good” and “bad”
smugglers in a similar fashion to the situation described by Akerlof (1970). However,
compared to the market analysed by Akerlof, the consequences of a bad choice can be much
more severe in the case of human smuggling, as they can include physical abuse and the loss of
life. For instance, 3% of the migrants surveyed at the US-Mexico border experienced abuse by
a group member and 6% witnessed abuse by a group member (Slack and Martínez 2018: 162,
N = 655). According to the figures from the Missing Migrant Project database compiled by
IOM, the number of deaths recorded at the US-Mexico border was at least 2336 for the period
2014–2019 with a yearly average of 389 fatalities. The figures for the Mediterranean route are
even starker: 14 migrants are estimated to have lost their life per 1000 people safely crossing in
2018 and 7 per 1000 in 2019.
While migrants face the most severe risks, uncertainty also affects smugglers. For instance,
migrants might refuse to pay a smuggler, or just disappear, after a service has been rendered, or
they can report the whereabouts of a smuggler to the authorities (Ayalew Mengiste 2018: 66–
67 offers some evidence on this point in the context of Eritrean smuggling). Akerlof (1970:
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499–500) identified a number of mechanisms that market players can resort to in order to
sustain transactions. These include offering guarantees and developing brand names or relying
on a licensing system developed by a third party. We discuss these mechanisms in the context
of human smuggling in the remainder of the paper.
Decisions Under Scarcity of Trust
Information asymmetries would not matter that much if the smuggling market was character-
ized by a high level of trust. Several authors have pointed to the importance of trust in
supporting transactions in legal settings (Gambetta 1988; Coleman 1990; Yamagishi and
Yamagishi 1994; Hardin 2006) as well as illegal ones (McCarthy et al. 1998; Campana and
Varese 2013). The importance of trust has been highlighted by several scholars also in the
context of human smuggling and regardless of the route under consideration. Spener (2004),
Kyle and Scarcelli (2009) and Sanchez et al. (2018) have looked at various routes in the USA
while Bilger et al. (2006), Triandafyllidou and Maroukis (2012), Campana and Varese (2016)
and Achilli (2018) have considered various routes into Europe: they all come to the same
conclusion (Zhang et al. 2018 offer an over-arching view). Migrants themselves have cited
trustworthiness as one of the key quality they value in smugglers (Slack and Martínez 2018:
152). This is little disagreement that trust is important. However, building it is not an easy task.
This is particularly true in the context of human smuggling where a number of factors that
might hinder such creation.
One key factor is the constant risk of being cheated, that is, provided with a service of a
lower quality than promised or provided with no service at all. This is indeed a risk that
migrants we interviewed perceive as concrete. There are a number of ways in which migrants
may fall victim to cheating. Outright fraud constitutes a classic example. One of our inter-
viewees witnessed an entire family paying 11,000 USD to a smuggler who then immediately
disappeared after claiming that he was going to get a taxi for them (interview 17). A similar
story was related to us by another interviewee (interview 16). In other cases, dishonest actors
would claim not to be able to accept the local currency, for example Libyan dinars, and
offering instead to exchange the migrant’s money into Euros or US dollars only to disappear
(interview 5).
The belief that one person may conceivably end up being cheated ultimately erodes
collective trust. The majority of the migrants we interviewed were rather upfront about their
(low) expectations with regard to the trustworthiness of smugglers. The picture that emerges is
one in which smugglers tend to be collectively perceived as untrustworthy.2 Migrants seem to
have entered the smuggling process with relatively low expectations among the level of
collective trust present in the smuggling market. While we do not possess survey data that
directly measure such level, our limited evidence suggests that trust is likely to be in short
supply. Yet, transactions do take place as is testified by the fact that all our respondents had
ultimately made an agreement with a smuggler and successfully entered the European Union.
If generalised trust is on the lower end of the spectrum, we can expect two separate
strategies to be adopted by migrants and smugglers, respectively. Migrants need to develop
strategies to sort the more trustworthy smugglers from less trustworthy ones. On the other
2 It should be noted here that all our interviews were conducted in Europe, therefore after the riskiest part of the
smuggling experience. Further work is needed to measure the level of trust before entering the smuggling
process.
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hand, trustworthy smugglers—the “good” smugglers as Achilli (2018) puts it—need to
develop strategies to distinguish themselves from the less trustworthy competitors. We now
turn to explore some of these strategies in more detail.
Gathering Information
In choosing a smuggler, migrants first need to collect information about the available
counterparts and the type and quality of the services offered. Information-gathering is a key
stage in one’s decision-making process (Elster 1989). Its importance is reflected in the words
of one interviewee: “I took three months to research because if someone screwed me over, I
would be in trouble. I would be finished and die in the desert. I wouldn’t have anything else if
they had stolen from me.” (interview 11). Van Liempt and Doomernik (2006: 176) collected
and analysed the life stories of 68 migrants who entered the Netherlands irregularly and
pointed out “how careful migrants are in deciding with whom to migrate”. As noted by
Sanchez et al. (2018: 18) in the context of sea crossings from Libya into Italy, “decisions
concerning travel with smugglers were typically not improvised”. Ethnographic work with
Anglophone Cameroonians carried by Alpes (2012) points to a similar conclusion.
Personal contacts remain a major source of information. Among our interviewees, the
“word-of-mouth” approach, mostly through family and friends, still appears to be the principal
strategy to collect information (interview 7; interview 10; interview 11; interview 17). The
reliance on personal contacts in the context of migration has been widely documented (see,
among others, Herman 2006). Irregular migration is no exception. Van Liempt and Doomernik
(2006: 174) pointed out that “[m]ost of the respondents had met their first smuggler through
family members, friends, or acquaintances”. In a survey with 686 migrants who have crossed
from Libya into Italy, Sanchez et al. (2018: 26) found that 74% of the respondents had used
personal contacts to get in touch with their most trusted source of information (also Optimity
Advisors and Seefar 2017: 41). On the Mexico-US route, 53% of the 655 migrants surveyed in
Slack and Martinez’s sample (2018: 162) made contact with the smuggler through someone
they knew. Migrants who successfully arrived at their destination are often a valuable source of
information, as highlighted by one of our interviewee (interview 15).
Sometimes it is the smugglers themselves that pro-actively convey information about
their activity. Several interviewees have highlighted the entrepreneurialism of smugglers
in their active search for clients: “There are buses and you don’t know who is a smuggler
but they say, ‘sir we will get you to the border of Libya if you give us 400 dollars”
(interview 2). Another interviewee was approached by a person and told: “I have this
passport that looks like you and can smuggle you out but you need to remove your beard
and hair.” (interview 15).
Not all the decisions can be made prior to departure. Migrants might find themselves
in a position of having to choose new smugglers while en route. This is often the
consequence of the smuggling operations being fragmented and run by localised groups
(Zhang and Chin 2002; Içduygu and Toktas 2002; Campana 2018, 2020). Smuggling
hubs can then play an important role for the dissemination of information. Such hubs are
often an “open secret” (see, among others, van Liempt and Doomernik 2006; Spener
2009; Achilli 2018). Evidence from our fieldwork also supports this view (interview 7;
interview 9; interview 10; interview 17). Our interviewees mentioned particular squares
or neighbourhoods, often lined with cafes or market stalls, where smugglers could be
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found. In some cases, transport hubs double as smuggling hubs. What is interesting about
smuggling hubs is that they not only fluidify the meeting of demand and supply by
allowing a better—and more targeted—circulation of information, but they also provide
an infrastructure (e.g. cafes) to facilitate face-to-face meetings. As we will discuss in the
next section, this is a crucial step in checking a smuggler’s credentials. Refugee camps
are, perhaps not unexpectedly, among such hubs: “the smuggler was living with the
people in the camp and everyone knew him. Everyone knew he was a smuggler, that he
was Kurdish and what his name was”. (Interview 16).
With the evolution of information technology, migrants and smugglers alike have
started to turn to online sources, particularly social media. The latter provides a platform
for migrants to gather information beyond the traditional boundaries of their acquain-
tances or physical hubs. While not replacing word of mouth, social media appears to play
an increasingly important role. A handful of interviewees have indicated that they have
accessed Facebook to gather information about smugglers (interview 11; interview 13;
interview 17). One interviewee has indicated the presence of “well-know groups” on
Facebook where users “write that they arrived and you can talk to them and ask them the
questions like how did you arrive, with which smuggler, they give you his phone number
etc. I did a lot of research and talked to a lot of people” (interview 11). The findings by
Dekker et al. (2018) go in the same direction: of the 51 Syrian refugees they have
interviewed in the Netherlands, 80% had consulted social networking websites such as
Facebook and LinkedIn. Diba et al. (2019) offer further evidence on the recourse to
Facebook as source of information when searching for a smuggler. However, the use of
social media, and information technology more generally, varies greatly among respon-
dents. Sanchez et al. (2018: 35) show that the use of smartphones to find information or
plan onwards movements from Italy varied from 100% among the Syrians to 27% among
migrants from Ivory Coast, 29% from Bangladesh and 32% from Ghana (for a further
discussion on the use of smartphones while travelling, we refer to Gillespie et al. 2016
and Zijlstra and Liempt 2017).
From an information-gathering perspective, it is important to highlight the interplay
between online and offline interactions. This emerges clearly from the testimony of one
interviewee: “I found the smuggler on Facebook and then went to his office. He was
Turkish. I asked people if he was good and they said he was good, so I went with him”
(interview 19). While family and friends remain an important source of information, this
does not imply that the quality of such information is always superior. As pointed out by
Sanchez et al. (2018: 27), “friends, acquaintances, members of the diaspora, as well as
humanitarian staff often provide inaccurate or altogether mistaken information to mi-
grants. Many interviewed migrants reported receiving bad advice from friends, relatives
and community members, and on occasion regretted having followed it” (also Optimity
Advisors and Seefar 2017: 23). Some of our interviewees have indeed used social media,
and more generally the Internet, to complement and at times double check the informa-
tion gathered through personal contacts. This points to a tendency towards an integration
between online and offline. For example, price comparison between smugglers has been
cited as a way in which migrants have leveraged the potential of online websites—in the
same fashion as with licit products and services such as insurances policies, hotel rooms
or airfares. When asked about how he could tell if what he actually paid to a smuggler
was a good price, one interviewee answered: “You look on Facebook. You hear others’
experiences and what is the normal price at that time” (interview 14).
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Judging a Smuggler’s Trustworthiness
Once information is gathered, migrants are faced with the problem of checking the veracity of
such information and then make a judgment about the trustworthiness of a given smuggler.
This is a difficult task in the context of acute information asymmetry and the absence of an
independent regulator. As maintained by Alpes (2012: 93) in the context of Anglophone
Cameroon, trust in information is crucial in explaining “contemporary perception and practices
of emigration”. But which strategies can migrants rely upon to verify whether the information
conveyed is accurate and the smuggler is genuinely acting in good faith? We argue that two
intertwined factors play a crucial role: reputation and communities.
Reputation
As with other illegal markets (Reuter 1983, 1985), reputation is key also in human smuggling.
Possessing a reputation for being reliable and competent is viewed as a vital aspect of a
smuggler’s identity and something that might tip the balance in favour of one smuggler rather
than another (Chin 1999; Bilger et al. 2006; Spener 2009; Optimity Advisors 2015; Sanchez
2015; Campana 2018). However, cheaters and unreliable smugglers also have a strong
incentive to convey misleading information or to pose as genuine and reliable. In a context
in which no independent authority is available to offer guarantees and check credentials,
migrants need to rely on alternative strategies. Several interviewees have indicated the key role
played by the reach of one’s reputation. As impostors find it costly to convey and sustain their
fabricated reputation among a larger audience group, the more people mention the name of a
smuggler, the more likely it is that that piece of information is correct, and that the smuggler
himself is genuine and potentially reliable. This is a mechanism similar to the one employed by
bona fide Mafiosi when running protection rackets, as observed by Gambetta (2019: 191–192;
bona fide Mafiosi have the problem of convincing newcomers that their credentials are
genuine). In the case of human smuggling, this mechanism emerges quite neatly from the
words of one interviewee:
I talked to people and began to ask if they knew this smuggler. […] I asked people and
met people... I even met a second smuggler but I trusted this one […] He got them there
without problem. So I thought if these people could arrive, why cannot I? […] I began to
have trust and feel it was safe. (Interview 17).
In the same vein, another interviewee explained: “There are a lot of smugglers... good and bad,
those who steal. So I got this one through the recommendation of my friends. I asked around
about him and asked 3 or 4 people and they said he is good. […] He was well-known for
having good behaviour in his work”. (Interview 11; also interviews 5 and 7).
Whenever possible, migrants will try to verify the credentials of a smuggler through
the collection of information about the actual outcome of the journeys organised by him
(interview 13; interview 17; interview 21). A reputation for being successful, perhaps not
surprisingly, is a key asset for smugglers: “I heard from people that he has had success in
smuggling people. […] I spoke with a lot of people and he was able to get people to their
destination in Europe through his way” (interview 11), while another interviewee main-
tained: “My family was doing some research about these guys and they heard that this
guy takes people from Turkey to England safely and regularly” (interview 12). Another
interviewee makes a similar point: “We spoke to people that we knew, people who left
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and who arrived and asked ‘which smuggler did you go with? How was the behaviour of
the smuggler?’ In the end, there were three smugglers that had honest behaviour”
(interview 15; interview 10 recalls a similar story). On the contrary, a reputation for
being unsuccessful can harm the business of smuggler (interview 10). Equally, as
evidenced by Kyle and Scarcelli 2009: 308) in relation to smuggling from Cuba and
Haiti, a reputation for violence is also detrimental for business: “[o]ne of the primary
dampers on violence by smugglers is that it’s not good for repeated business”.
Communities
Reputations do not travel easily (Reuter 1983, 1985), so it is not surprising that, whenever
possible, migrants will approach people in their community to ask for recommendations. Such
recommendations can come from cousins (interview 7), uncles (interview 13), personal friends
(interview 11) and family friends (interview 12). The role of communities in circulating
information about smugglers has been documented in different settings, from Ecuador
(Stone-Cadena and Alvarez Velasco) to Mexico (Sanchez 2015), Afghanistan (Majidi 2018),
Somalia (Majidi 2018) and Syria (Achilli 2018).
The emergence of social media and online interactions has recast the problem of
checking the veracity of information in new ways. Besides physical communities of
friends and people from the same village or town, there are now have virtual commu-
nities hosted on social medial platform. Exactly as offline communities, online commu-
nities can help to build and check reputations. For instance, online-based feedback is
cited by migrants as a strategy to check the credentials of a given smuggler. As put it by
one of our interviewees, “The most important thing is the reviews. […] I looked for the
smuggler with the best rating, with the happiest customers. I would ask people how it
was and some they gave me a positive review and said the experience was good while
others said be careful, don’t go with him. He is bad, he laughed at me, he stole from me
etc. So we had to choose who was the best smuggler” (interview 11). According to a
second interviewee, “on social media you can just search and find people who had an
experience with some agent and they publish it. It’s like experience-sharing to help each
other” (interview 14). This is confirmed by an analysis conducted by Roberts (2017) of
ten Arabic-speaking Facebook groups in which smuggling services were advertised and
discussed. In her work, she identified instances of both positive and negative feedback in
relation to named smugglers; in some cases, smugglers even replied to the criticisms and
tried to redress the situation (Roberts 2017: 40–46). Diba et al. (2019: 167) further
document instances of naming-and-shaming fraudulent smugglers on Facebook: “[t]hese
posts would often be very lengthy, detailing the unscrupulous smuggler’s name, nation-
ality, the country and the city they were operating in, and how they had defrauded their
victim or victims, particularly regarding to payment”. The same work also offers further
evidence of “customer feedback” (Diba et al. 2019: 168).
For smugglers, an online presence can be a double-edge sword. On a one hand, it is
an opportunity to boost their reputation and build trust. This can be done in a number of
ways: for instance, smugglers may post a picture of themselves at the end of a successful
trip or they may share videos received from migrants they have successfully smuggled. A
particularly powerful strategy is to post screenshots of conversations—generally on
WhatsApp or Telegram—a smuggler has had with his clients while they were en route
to their destination. Smugglers can craft an image of themselves as reliable, careful and
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polite (Roberts 2017: 21–23; this is confirmed by Diba et al. 2019: 168).3 On the other
hand, online information is difficult to control and restrict and can be easily accessed by
law enforcement agencies. This is a concern explicitly expressed by one smuggler
interviewed by Diba et al. (2019: 166): “I don’t trust the internet so much anyway
because you never know who might be watching”.
However, while online platforms offer new ways to circulate information, including
through a feedback mechanism, face-to-face interactions and particularly cues from a smug-
gler’s appearance and manners still play a crucial role in shaping a migrant’s judgment. A
number of interviewees highlighted the continuing importance of personal contacts before a
decision is made. One interviewee explained that “from his talk I was able to see that this one
was a serious one […] I felt like he was serious” (interview 10) while a second interviewee
maintained: “We sat in the café and talked and he had a good demeanour” (interview 11).
According to another interviewee, “I had trust after I saw the way he received me well”
(interview 13). “You know that something emotionally—told us another interviewee—
Sometimes we see someone and are comfortable with him and you don’t feel you are not
comfortable with him. Someone you feel in his face that I can see the devil in your face. I
spoke to some smugglers and I judged from their appearance that I was not comfortable with
them”. (Interview 10). Evidence from our interviewees shows that face-to-face meetings can
be the make-or-break of a transaction: “I didn’t have trust in him. When you go to meet him for
a cup of coffee…you feel that he is lying, trying to exploit you” (interview 17). “It is important
to meet face to face before deciding”, told us another interviewee (interview 12).
Substitutes for Trust: Guarantees, Escrow Services and Hostage-Taking
The strategies discussed so far are designed to foster transactions by creating a sufficient level
of trust between smugglers and migrants. However, there are cases where such a level of trust
still fails to materialise, and therefore, alternatives to trust need to be brought in to support
transactions. Based on the existing literature and the findings from our fieldwork, we believe
that three strategies are particularly relevant: guarantees, third-party escrow services and the
use of information as a hostage.
Guarantees
One strategy that smugglers might adopt is to offer a guarantee: if a journey is not successful,
migrants will be able to repeat it at no additional cost. Akerlof (1970) has identified guarantees
as a strategy that good sellers might adopt to differentiate themselves from the bad ones (as
only the good sellers would be able to afford to offer such guarantees). There is evidence of
such guarantees offered along a variety of smuggling routes. Stone-Cadena and Álvarez
Velasco (2018) have documented it in relation to smuggling from Ecuador to Mexico and
the USA; Guevara González 2018) at the Southern Mexican border and Sanchez (2015) in
Mexico more generally. Aksel et al. (2015) have found evidence of such guarantees among
3 An online presence can, however, be a double-edged sword for smugglers. Not only does it make them more
visible to law enforcement agencies, but it can also adversely affect their reputation. Interestingly, one inter-
viewee expressed his belief that actively seeking out “clients” on social media might indicate a lower quality of
the service as smugglers who are experienced and “famous” do not have the time to manage Facebook pages
(interview 10).
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Afghani and Pakistani migrants crossing the border between Pakistan and Iran. Offering
guarantees in the form of multiple attempts was also mentioned by a number of our inter-
viewees (interview 5; interview 12; interview 15; interview 16). Crucially, there is evidence
from our fieldwork that migrants have effectively resorted to this guarantee, and that the
promise of multiple attempts has been upheld by smugglers. One interviewee told us: “I paid
him and I tried a few times. After one week I arrived because I have been caught by police a
few times” (interview 7). Another interviewee who made three attempts to cross into Europe
also maintained that he had to pay only once (interview 16). And a further interviewee recalled
that:
the patrol [coastguard] came and returned us and asked us the same question. The next
day they [smugglers] took us out again and the smuggler came and said to us that “since
you didn’t say anything about me [to the patrol] I will send you out again on the same
price.” (interview 17).
Third-party Escrow Services
Another strategy that smugglers may resort to is to split the payment into two parts: a deposit
before departure and the remaining amount upon the successful arrival. The deposit offers a
two-way guarantee: it gives assurance not only to the migrant but also to the smuggler as a
non-refundable deposit commits a migrant to buy the service of that given smuggler. Research
has shown that splitting the payment appears to be a widely used arrangement in human
smuggling. It has been documented in relation to multiple routes, ranging from smuggling out
of China (Chin 1999) to routes out of Cuba and Haiti (Kyle and Scarcelli 2009) or along the
Eastern Mediterranean route (Triandafyllidou and Maroukis 2012). Our interviews have also
pointed to the payment of deposits (interview 7; interview 11).
Asking for a partial payment only, however, opens up a further issue: how can a smuggler
be sure that a migrant will pay the remaining amount once the journey is completed? To put it
another way, it is costly—if at all possible—for, say, a Turkish-based smuggler or a Libyan-
based smuggler to monitor migrants once they arrive in Italy and Greece, and a fortiori to
collect the remaining sums. This is all the more true in a context where smuggling is
fragmented and smugglers are directly involved in the organisation of only one part of a
longer journey (Campana 2018). A solution to this problem is offered by escrow services. An
escrow service is an arrangement, whereby a third party is brought in with the goal of receiving
a sum of money and then eventually disbursing it when the conditions set by the seller—and
agreed by the buyer—are met. Essentially, the third party will hold the funds until the
transaction has reached a successful outcome, i.e. in the case of smuggling when a migrant
has successfully reached the agreed destination. This system increases the confidence of
migrants in choosing a given smuggler while offering to a smuggler the guarantee that the
full amount is available and accessible (with conditions). This arrangement has been docu-
mented among smugglers operating between Afghanistan/Pakistan and the UK (Koser 2008)
and more generally on routes to Europe across Turkey and Greece (Içduygu and Toktas 2002;
Triandafyllidou and Maroukis 2012). Financial services such as hawala or Western Union can
also be used to this end (Majidi 2018; Optimity Advisors 2015: 47). A considerable number of
interviewees mentioned using an escrow service as part of their transaction with a smuggler
(interview 3; interview 9; interview 10; interview 17; interview 27; interview 33). The system
only works if both parties trust the broker (i.e. the escrow service provider). In this case, the
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smuggler borrows reputational capital from the third party. Crucially, the simplicity of this
arrangement makes it very flexible and easy to set up. For example, in one case, it was a hotel
owner who was identified as trustworthy by a migrant who was an escrow service provider
(interview 15).
Information as a Hostage
Migrants appear to have pro-actively developed strategies to hold smugglers to their promises.
One such strategy is known in cooperation theory as “hostage-taking” (Schelling 1960 and
2006; Cook et al. 2005; Schelling 2006; Campana and Varese 2013). In this case, it is the
compromising information about the smuggler’s activity that is held hostage (without the need
for any physical hostage). The use of hostage-taking as a strategy to guarantee promises (Raub
2004) is a practice that has a long and well-documented history. For instance, Ancient Romans
started resorting to it as early as the end of the Second Punic War in 202 BC (Allen 2006: 10).
The use of non-physical goods, such as compromising information, has been documented in a
number of illegal settings from paedophile rings to criminal organisations (Gambetta 2009;
Campana and Varese 2013). The (successful) use of this strategy in the context of human
smuggling clearly emerges from the testimony below:
We had the number of the smuggler and called him and told him this happened with us
and the boat was broken and we did not tell the police about you and because of that we
want a new trip or we will return to the police. You are this person and one of the men
said that “I have a photo of you. I took a photo of you. Believe me I will publish the
photo if you don’t bring us another boat and we also have children and women with us
so behave with us” and he [the smuggler] said “okay, okay, tomorrow I will get you a
new boat and will send you on a new trip.” (interview 17).
The same interviewee appears to have resorted to a similar mechanism more than once during
the journey:
So I went back and talked to the smuggler about what had happened and said “Look I
didn’t tell them about you. They were searching and asking “from where did you get the
passport, give us the name of the person from whom you received the passport”. If I
wanted to ruin your life, I could have given them your name. Your picture is with me…”
I had learned this from the man in Turkey. “Also the photo of the girl who went with me
to the airport is with me and her phone number. And the house where people wait to be
smuggled before their plane comes...” (interview 17).
This is a strategy that has not received much attention in the literature on human smuggling;
yet, it is indicative of a more nuanced picture than the binary “predator-victim” perspective.
Conclusions
Choosing a smuggler is a very difficult task as it may lead to severe adverse consequences.
These could range from being cheated to being subject to abuse up to the loss of one’s own
life. In this paper, we studied how migrants faced with different courses of action when
choosing a smuggler make a decision to pick the one that is likely to have the best overall
outcome—under very difficult conditions. More specifically, we explored both the challenges
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related to transacting in the context of human smuggling and the strategies developed to
overcome these challenges.
We maintained that the choice of a smuggler is normally taken under a number of
challenging conditions. Firstly, illegality, which in turn leads to the absence of formal
enforcement mechanisms to solve disputes, ensures compliance and enforce contracts. Fur-
thermore, illegality hinders the availability and quality of the information available (Reuter
1983 and 1985; Campana and Varese 2013). Secondly, there exists severe information
asymmetry between migrants and smugglers (Bilger et al. 2006; Campana and Varese 2013)
and, further, a context of low generalised trust. Yet, successful transactions between smugglers
and migrants do take place regularly around the World. Theoretically, this poses an interesting
conundrum similar to one explored by George Akerlof (1970) in his seminal study of the
second-hand car market (Bilger et al. 2006). What strategies are employed to address such
conundrum?
Information plays a crucial role in a migrant’s decision-making. Gathering information
about smugglers is the first key step. This is done through personal contacts as well as online
social media. While the former is still prevalent, social media have an increasing prominence.
Crucially, the two main sources are not mutually exclusive, but we observed a tendency
towards an integration between online and offline. While, for instance, migrants might use the
Internet to find a smuggler or compare prices, they will nonetheless arrange a face-to-face
meeting and evaluate physical cues, i.e. appearance and manners, before making their final
decision.
When judging the veracity of the information collected, we highlighted the role played by
(a) reputation and (b) communities. As is also the case in other illegal markets (Reuter 1983),
reputation plays a crucial role. But how can a reputation be checked? We maintained that the
reach of a smuggler’s reputation is taken as a sign of a smuggler’s bona fide intentions and
reliability. The more people mention the name of a smuggler (in a positive light), the more
likely it is that that piece of information is reliable. In addition, migrants also try to collect
information about the actual outcomes of journeys to assess the credentials of smugglers. As
reputations do not travel easily, local communities still play a crucial role in checking
information about smugglers. Yet, they are now being supplemented by virtual communities
on social media: spaces in which migrants can gather information from beyond the immediate
physical circle and/or close friends and family members. Crucially, they can also check that
information through online feedback, comments and contacts with other migrants. Smugglers
themselves may also rely on pro-active strategies to build a positive reputation in virtual
communities.
However, it might not always be possible to generate sufficient trust between indi-
vidual smugglers and migrants for a transaction to materialise. As a solution, both parties
have developed additional strategies to foster transactions. We discussed three such
strategies in detail: guarantees, third-party escrow services and the use of information
as a hostage. For instance, as a guarantee, migrants are promised multiple attempts at no
extra cost if the first journey is unsuccessful. Another strategy is to split the payment into
two parts and bring in a third-party escrow service to assure the migrant about the bona
fide character of the smuggler. Finally, migrants may use compromising information on
the smuggler as a so-called hostage-taking strategy to ensure that the latter maintains his
commitments—in a similar fashion to what has been observed in other contexts outside
the reach of the law such as paedophile rings, corruption rings and criminal groups
(Gambetta 2009; Campana and Varese 2013).
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This paper has pointed to a broad policy implication, namely the need to move away from a
simplistic predator-victim discourse—in line with Zhang, Sanchez and Achilli (2018). Inter-
actions underpinning the smuggling market are more complex and nuanced—and in many
ways similar to those taking place in other markets, both legal and illegal, that are characterised
by similar features (e.g. generalised low trust, information asymmetries, difficulties in
checking credentials and reputations). Secondly, this paper has shown that migrants do possess
agency: they collect information and make decisions. This confirms the analytic distinction
between human trafficking and smuggling (Campana and Varese 2016; Kleemans 2011). This
is not to say that migrant journeys are without risk, nor that the relationship between migrants
and smugglers is symmetrical—quite the opposite, as documented cases of abuse and death
suffered by migrants remind us.
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